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385 
SEANA SHIFFRIN’S THINKER-BASED 
THEORY OF FREE SPEECH: ELEGANT 
AND INSIGHTFUL, BUT WILL IT WORK IN 
PRACTICE? 
James Weinstein* 
INTRODUCTION 
Seana Shiffrin offers a persuasive account of how free 
speech is essential to the realization of several profound interests 
that we have as thinkers. This approach avoids the usual sharp 
separation of speaker and listener interests, a dichotomy that, 
though useful in many ways, also shortchanges a full account of 
important free speech interests. Another advantage of Seana’s 
theory is that the interests that underlie it are all relatively 
uncontroversial. Thus no one can reasonably deny that we have 
vital interests in “self-development, self-knowledge, knowledge 
of others, others’ knowledge of and respect for oneself, 
knowledge of the environments in which they interact, 
opportunities for the exercise of one’s intellectual capacities 
including the imagination, and the intellectual prerequisites of 
moral relations.”1 Similarly, there is no disputing that free speech 
is essential to the realization of these basic values. 
With respect to the interests of being known and respected 
by others, Seana explains that “[i]f what makes one a distinctive 
individual qua person is largely a matter of the contents of one’s 
mind,” it follows that “to be known by others requires the ability 
to transmit the contents of one’s mind to others.”2 As regards 
self-knowledge and related interests, Seana correctly observes 
that for many people “some thoughts may only be fully 
identified and known to themselves if made linguistically or 
 
 *  Amelia D. Lewis Professor of Constitutional Law, Sandra Day O’Connor 
College of Law, Arizona State University. 
 1. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 
CONST. COMMENT. 283, 291 (2011). 
 2. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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representationally explicit.”3 This tight connection between 
speech and its underlying values gives Seana’s theory both a firm 
foundation and commendable coherence. So aside from a few 
quibbles,4 I endorse Seana’s poignant account of a cluster of 
deep and abiding interests at the core of what makes us human 
and their relation to free speech. 
Still, for all its advantages, Seana’s theory is not, in my view, 
a good theory of freedom of expression. In particular, I have 
grave concerns about its ability to generate doctrinal rules that 
will in practice adequately protect vital free speech interests, 
especially those most in need of protection from governmental 
suppression. Less fatally, but still a significant problem, Seana’s 
lack of concern for doctrinal fit also detracts from the utility of 
her theory. But before discussing these serious defects in Seana’s 
theory, I want to say a few more words about its relative 
strengths. 
WAYS IN WHICH SEANA’S THEORY IS AN 
IMPROVEMENT OVER PREVIOUS FREE SPEECH 
THEORIES 
Seana claims that her thinker-based theory provides “a 
stronger and more coherent foundation for the most important 
free speech protections than rival free speech theories, including 
the more common speaker-based or listener-based autonomy 
theories.”5 I am not sufficiently familiar with the various 
colorations of autonomy-based theories to comment on this 
claim as a global matter. I am confident, however, that Seana’s 
theory has a more solid foundation than, say, Martin Redish’s 
self-realization theory, which I have previously described as 
“hovering in mid-air.”6 And in addition to having a deep and 
secure philosophical foundation, Seana’s theory is, as I have 
 
 3. Id. at 292. 
 4. For instance, Seana’s claim that “speech and expression are the only precise 
avenues by which one can be known as the individual one is by others,” id., is somewhat 
of an overstatement. Observation of what a person does, especially the way she treats 
other people, can often give us both a more precise and more accurate picture of “the 
individual one is” than what an individual says, especially about herself. Also, I wonder if 
Seana’s repeated emphasis on the importance of rationality and, in particular, her desire 
to protect “rational deliberation” may not be in some tension with the extension of her 
theory to encompass purely emotive expression. Id. at 300. 
 5. Id. at 284. 
 6. James Weinstein, Fools, Knaves, and the Protection of Commercial Speech: A 
Response to Professor Redish, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 133, 160 (2007). 
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mentioned, rooted in a basic commitment that would garner nigh 
unto universal consensus in any liberal society. As a sociological 
matter, it thus has a firmer foundation than do several other 
autonomy theories, including the theory Ed Baker defends in 
this Symposium, which Ed himself admits rests on a “wildly 
contested” account of autonomy.7 There is, as I elaborate in my 
response to Ed, considerable advantage in basing a theory of 
free speech in commitments that attract wide-spread acceptance 
by both legal actors and the American public.8 
As I have also mentioned, Seana’s thinker-based theory 
avoids dividing us into speakers or listeners, as is typical of other 
theories, including the brilliant listener-based theory long ago 
proposed (but later retracted) by Tim Scanlon.9 Not only does 
Seana’s holistic approach more clearly identify interests that may 
have been obscured by the traditional dichotomy, but it also 
tends to make her theory more coherent than rival autonomy 
theories. For example, Seana’s theory offers a deeper, more 
satisfying explanation of the connection between free speech and 
abstract art or music than do the other autonomy-based theories 
with which I am familiar. And since autonomy theories as a 
group more readily explain this connection than do democracy-
based theories, Seana’s thinker-based explanation increases this 
generic advantage.10 
Despite these not insignificant advantages over other 
theories, Seana’s thinker-based theory is nonetheless not overall 
a very good theory of freedom of expression. First, by 
forswearing any concern with its fit with current practices, 
Seana’s theory is, despite its own admirable coherence, unlikely 
to help make current doctrine more coherent. In addition, and 
much more problematically, her theory would, if ever put into 
practice, dilute the rigorous protection that current doctrine 
provides political dissent. My disagreement with Seana is 
therefore not as much theoretical as it is meta-theoretical, 
 
 7. C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 269 
(2011).  
 8. James Weinstein, Free Speech and Legitimacy: A Response to Ed Baker, 27 
CONST. COMMENT. 361, 383 n.80 (2011). 
 9. Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 
(1972). 
 10. This is not to say that abstract art and music cannot be plausibly explained in 
democratic terms, as Robert Post ably demonstrates. See Robert Post, Participatory 
Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 486 (2011). Although Robert’s 
explanation may not be as straightforward as those offered by Seana’s thinker-based 
theory or other autonomy theories, it is by no means “bizarrely indirect” as Seana 
alleges. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 285. 
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stemming from our quite different conceptions of what a theory 
of free speech should accomplish. 
THE PROBLEM WITH PURELY NORMATIVE FREE 
SPEECH THEORIES 
Seana explains that it is not her goal in identifying the 
theoretical foundation of free speech to “provide the best 
theoretical account of our system or our current practices of 
protecting (or failing to protect, as the case may be) free 
speech.”11 In her view, articulating a theory among “more ideal 
lines”12 provides a framework for assessing whether current 
practices are justified, as well as supplying a measurement for 
reform. The implication here seems to be that a theory’s ability 
to normatively critique current practices and offer suggestions 
for reform will be diminished if, in addition to identifying a 
normatively appealing guiding value, it can also explain the basic 
features of current practices in terms of this value. I do not see 
why this should be the case.13 Indeed, as Vincent Blasi has aptly 
observed, in some respects just the opposite is true, for “[t]he 
explanatory project introduces one kind of discipline that can 
stimulate normative insights and judgments that might not be 
forthcoming in a zero-based normative inquiry.”14 
More importantly, as Vince also notes, “rationalization can 
be a socially functional enterprise, at least when it does not 
entirely pre-empt or crowd out independent critical 
evaluation.”15 Echoing this view, I argue in my response to Ed 
that a normatively appealing theory that also explains a great 
deal of current doctrine can bring coherence to an area of the 
law badly in need of a basic organizing principle. So though 
Seana’s theory gets good marks for its own coherence, her lack 
of interest in the explanatory dimension undercuts its usefulness 
 
 11. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 284 (emphasis in original). 
 12. Id. 
 13. For example, my view that a commitment to participatory democracy explains 
the pattern of free speech decisions better than any other free speech value did not 
hinder me from criticizing as wrongly decided the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens 
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). See James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as 
the Central Value of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 500–01 (2011). 
 14. Vincent Blasi, Democratic Participation and the Freedom of Speech: A Response 
to Post and Weinstein, 97 VA. L. Rev. 531, 531 (2011).  
 15. Id. Vince also observes that “the kind of normative analysis that law professors 
undertake is almost inevitably of the second-best variety. For lack of training and 
temperament, few of us are capable of the purest forms of truth seeking.” Though I 
heartily agree with this criticism, it does not apply to Seana, a trained moral philosopher.  
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for bringing coherence to free speech doctrine. I will not, 
however, attempt here to comprehensively assess how well her 
thinker-based theory fits or deviates from current doctrine but 
will merely note two basic shortcomings in its explanatory 
power. 
First, like most autonomy-based theories, it cannot easily 
explain the especially rigorous protection that current doctrine 
primarily reserves for political speech and other forms of public 
discourse.16 More profoundly, unlike most democracy-based 
theories of free speech, as well as Ed’s autonomy theory, which 
focus on the proper relation between the individual and the 
state, Seana’s theory would have a difficult time explaining why 
free speech restrictions apply exclusively to state action and not 
to private conduct.17 In any event, further examples are not 
necessary to demonstrate that Seana’s theory is not nearly as 
descriptively powerful a theory as one grounded in participatory 
democracy.18 I turn now to a much more serious defect in Seana’s 
theory: the inadequate protection it would likely provide vital 
speech that is most in need of constitutional protection. 
WEAKENING OF THE STRINGENT PROTECTION 
NEEDED TO PROTECT POLITICAL DISSENT 
Seana writes that “a decent regime of freedom of speech 
must provide a principled and strong form of protection for 
political speech and, in particular, for incendiary speech and 
other forms of dissent.”19 I couldn’t agree more. And this is one 
of several reasons why I favor a theory that easily explains the 
particularly rigorous protection that free speech doctrine 
 
 16. “[Speech] concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence 
of self-government. Accordingly, the Court has frequently reaffirmed that speech on 
public issues occupies the highest rung of the heirarchy of First Amendment values, and 
is entitled to special protection.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983); see Snyder 
v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (repeating the above quotation with minor 
deletions); see also Weinstein, supra note 13, at 499. 
 17. In her reply, Seana offers a plausible, though somewhat complicated and 
tentative, explanation of how her theory might incorporate a state action requirement. 
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Reply to Critics, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 417 (2011). In contrast, 
the participatory democracy theory that I propose can easily explain the state action 
requirement: the legitimacy of the legal system depends on government not preventing 
individuals from participating in the speech by which public opinion is formed. 
Weinstein, supra note 13, at 497–98. The ease with which a free speech theory can 
explain a desirable doctrinal feature should count in its favor. See supra text 
accompanying notes 10–11. 
 18. See, e.g., Post, supra note 10, at 482–89; Weinstein, supra note 13, at 497-501. 
 19. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 285 (emphasis added). 
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currently provides political speech and other types of expression 
essential to democratic self-governance, expression that the 
Supreme Court and commentators have referred to as “public 
discourse.”20 Seana’s theory would, however, afford “strong” 
protection not just for public discourse but also 
for religious speech, for fiction, art—whether abstract or 
representational—and music, for diaries and other forms of 
discourse meant primarily for self-consumption, and for that 
private speech and discourse, e.g. personal conversations and 
letters, crucial to developing, pursuing, and maintaining 
personal relationships.21 
She specifies, moreover, that “all of these forms of expres-
sion should enjoy foundational protection, by which I mean 
there should not be a lexical hierarchy of value between them.”22 
But in attempting to extend strong speech protection this widely, 
and with no lexical hierarchy, the rigorous protection currently 
afforded “political speech and, in particular, for incendiary 
speech and other forms of dissent”23 will inevitably be weakened. 
Current doctrine rigorously shields public discourse from 
content regulation and provides such expression virtually 
absolute protection from viewpoint discrimination.24 As I explain 
in my response to Ed,25 the extraordinary strength of this 
protection is in service of political legitimacy, a crucial 
democratic value that is impaired when government excludes 
individuals from expressing their views in public discourse. 
Reflecting the foundational importance of the political 
legitimacy it serves, this rigorous protection extends even to 
public discourse that is likely to cause serious harm. For 
example, Americans have a First Amendment right to 
 
 20. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22 (1971); Robert C. Post, The 
Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic 
Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601 (1990). 
 21. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 285. Some of this speech, for instance religious speech 
by a preacher in a public square or from the pulpit, will easily come within the scope of 
public discourse, as will fiction, art and music that is either overtly political, or a 
commentary on social conditions or practices. In contrast, other forms of religious 
speech, such as a teacher-initiated prayer in a public school, would not be considered 
public discourse. See James Weinstein, An Overview of American Free Speech Doctrine 
and its Application to Extreme Speech, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 82–83 
(Ivan Hare & James Weinstein, eds., 2009).  
 22. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 285. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See Weinstein, supra note 21, at 83, 85–86. 
 25. See Weinstein, supra note 8, at 380–84. 
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vehemently condemn their nation’s involvement in a war, even if 
such protests are likely to discourage our troops and encourage 
the enemy; or to express racist or homophobic ideas that can 
inflict emotional injury on minorities or encourage others to 
discriminate against them.26 Crucially, any attempt to extend the 
protection currently afforded public discourse, either across the 
board to all expression, as many commentators urge,27 or even to 
the more limited but still capacious range of speech 
encompassed by Seana’s theory, will inevitably end up diluting 
the fierce protection currently provided “incendiary speech and 
other forms of dissent.”28 
To see how trying to protect, without hierarchical 
distinction, all the expression encompassed by Seana’s theory 
will dilute the rigorous protection currently afforded speech that 
radically challenges the status quo, let’s first consider “forms of 
discourse meant primarily for self-consumption.”29 Suppose that 
a scientist, who has no interest in actually producing an 
especially virulent biotoxin, wants purely out of intellectual 
curiosity to figure out the process for doing so. As Seana 
correctly notes, “thoughts may only be fully identified and 
known to [the thinker] if made linguistically or representa-
tionally explicit.”30 Accordingly, this scientist wants to reduce her 
thoughts about how to produce the toxin to written formulas, 
drawings, and charts. But suppose further that Congress, 
concerned that terrorist organizations might gain access to such 
writings, has enacted a law forbidding anyone from making their 
thoughts about a certain class of biotoxins “linguistically or 
representationally explicit” in these ways. 
Under Seana’s thinker-based theory such a governmental 
restriction on scientific research would be a core breach of the 
thinker’s right that she so ably describes. Due to the grave risk to 
public safety that this research might produce, however, even if 
the legal community were to accept Seana’s theory of the First 
Amendment, most courts would likely uphold the restriction. 
Indeed, I think Seana might agree that despite the “strong” 
 
 26. See Weinstein, supra note 21, at 84–88. 
 27. See Weinstein, supra note 6, at 140; see also United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 
1577, 1585 (2010).  
 28. Cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (“To require a 
parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech alike could 
invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the [First] Amendment’s 
guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech.”). 
 29. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 285. 
 30. Id. at 292. 
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protection that her theory provides for externalizing the content 
of one’s mind, the government might legitimately suppress the 
externalization of thoughts in this and similar cases presenting a 
manifest risk of serious harm.31 
If, however, this risk of harm is sufficient to justify suppres-
sion of core thinker-based speech, then why would it not also be 
sufficient, as courts in this country once thought it was,32 for 
government to ban anti-war demonstrations likely to interfere 
with this country’s war effort? Or, as is the case in most 
European countries, why is it not grounds for banning the 
expression of racist ideas,33or the view that homosexuality is 
sinful,34 in order to prevent the spreading of “poison that leads to 
violence and discrimination”35against minorities and homo-
sexuals? But if Seana’s theory would permit the suppression of 
scientific research that threatens public safety, then without 
some “lexical hierarchy” in terms of the level of protection 
between political speech and “the discourse meant primarily for 
self-consumption” involved in scientific research, there would 
seem to be no “principled” way to protect anti-war 
demonstrations, racist or anti-homosexual speech, or any other 
type of “incendiary speech and other forms of dissent”36 that can 
be shown to pose a serious risk of harm. 
Next, let’s consider “that private speech and discourse, e.g. 
personal conversations and letters, crucial to developing, 
pursuing, and maintaining personal relationships.”37 Even more 
so than with speech meant primarily for self-consumption, the 
protection afforded this wide array of communication cannot 
plausibly be afforded the rigorous protection currently afforded 
core political speech. Suppose, for instance, that Melvin is 
 
 31. Somewhat to my surprise, Seana states in her reply that she thinks such writings 
should be protected. Shiffrin, supra note 17, at 435. Indeed, she apparently would not 
only protect the production of these writings but their publication as well. Id. For a fuller 
discussion of the constitutional limitations on governmental restrictions of scientific 
research, see James Weinstein, Democracy, Individual Rights and the Regulation of 
Science, 15 SCI.& ENGINEERING ETHICS 407 (2009).  
 32. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (upholding against 
First Amendment challenge the conviction of anti-war protestors for distributing leaflets 
that the Court found created a “clear and present danger” of obstructing the draft during 
World War I). 
 33. See Weinstein, supra note 21, at 84–85. 
 34. See Hammond v. DDP, [2004] EWHC 69 (Eng. & Wales Admin). 
 35. Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 1596, 1642 (2010). 
 36. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 285. 
 37. Id. 
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interested in “developing and pursuing” a personal relationship 
with women he finds particularly attractive whom he encounters 
in public, be it on the street, in the park, or on the bus. The 
problem is that Melvin wants to pursue the possibility of such 
relationships by expressing in graphic detail to these women the 
nature of his sexual attraction and the specific ways he would 
like to act on this attraction. 
Would courts applying Seana’s theory find Melvin’s speech 
protected? Would Seana? Or would they, as would I, find that 
despite the “strong” protection that should be afforded speech 
by which people seek to “develop and pursue” relationships, 
revealing in this way “the contents of one’s mind”38 can none-
theless be prohibited because of the harm it would likely cause 
its intended audience? And if the harm to women to whom 
Melvin expresses his thoughts were somehow deemed insuf-
ficient to overcome this protection, would Melvin also have the 
right to reveal his thoughts to underage girls whom he meets on 
the bus or in the park?39 And what about speech of this type 
directed from an employer to an employee; from a professor to 
student; or from a doctor to a patient? 
If (as I suspect they would) courts and Seana were to find 
that at least some, if not all, of this expression could be 
prohibited because of the harm that it would likely cause, then, 
for the reasons explained above, the rigorous protection 
currently afforded political speech, especially “incendiary speech 
and other forms of dissent,” would be significantly diluted. In 
contrast, under the democracy-based theory I have defended,40 
such dilution would not occur: because Melvin’s speech is not 
part of the expression by which people in a democratic society 
govern themselves, it is not entitled to the truly strong protection 
reserved for public discourse. Rather, it should be entitled to the 
somewhat less rigorous protection befitting important autonomy 
interests which can be outweighed by sufficiently weighty 
countervailing state interests, including the protection of 
individual autonomy interests of a different genus such as those 
imperiled by Melvin’s expression.41 
 
 38. Id. at 391. 
 39. Seana expressly declines to exclude children as relevant agents covered by her 
theory. Id. at 287 n.9. 
 40. Weinstein, supra note 13. 
 41. Seana does not specify in her opening statement the precise level of protection 
her theory would provide expression that her thinker-based principle encompasses. Her 
reply, however, makes clear that the “strong protection” she has in mind is, like the 
protection against viewpoint-based restrictions on public discourse provided by current 
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THE POSSIBILITY OF INTERNAL LIMITATIONS 
The dilution concern is premised on the view that both the 
scientific and sexually-graphic expression discussed above is 
within the scope of expression protected by Seana’s thinker-
based free speech principle. The scientific expression would 
seem plainly within this thinker-based principle. But perhaps 
there are one or more internal limitations on this principle that 
would deny protection to the sexually-graphic speech directed to 
others in the contexts I described. Consistent with Seana’s caveat 
that she is offering just a sketch and not a detailed statement of a 
thinker-based theory,42 she does not in her paper systematically 
discuss such limitations. We can, however, infer some limitations 
from her explanation for excluding “commercial and non-press, 
business corporate speech”43 from her thinker-based principle. 
But none of these limitations would seem to apply to Melvin’s 
sexually-graphic speech. 
First, Seana notes that commercial speech and the like does 
“not involve in any direct or straightforward fashion the 
revelation of individuals’ mental contents.”44 In contrast, the 
problem with Melvin’s speech is that it reveals the contents of 
his mind in too direct and straightforward a fashion. Next, Seana 
observes that with commercial and ordinary corporate business 
speech, “environmental pressures render more tenuous any 
charitable presupposition that such speech is sincere, authentic, 
or the product of autonomous processes.”45 Uninhibited expres-
 
doctrine, very rigorous indeed, perhaps even absolute. Shiffrin, supra note 17, at 425. 
Thus, she would apparently protect the right of scientists to publish formulas for virulent 
bio-toxin. Id. at 435. Significantly, Seana does not disagree with my prediction that courts 
applying her theory might not protect this and other types of harmful speech within the 
ambit of her free speech principle, and concedes that my fear about dilution of core 
political speech may be accurate. Id. at 426–27. She insists, however, that “[t]here is 
something quite strange about criticizing the content of a theory on the ground that it will 
be misunderstood, defied, or ignored in a particular institutional context or by particular 
institutional actors.” Id. at 426. But the view that not all speech within the scope of a 
thinker-based free speech principle must be protected regardless of consequences need 
not necessarily reflect misunderstanding, etc. of her theory. Rather, it could well 
represent reasonable disagreement about the strength of the protection such a capacious 
principle can plausibly afford speech in the real world. I should also clarify that the 
participatory democracy theory of free speech that I embrace is not as Seana suggests 
just some strategically “barber[ed]” version of her theory, id., but rather a theory 
grounded in a different basic value commitment. See Weinstein supra note 13, at 497–
504. 
 42. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 283. 
 43. Id. at 286. 
 44. Id. at 296. 
 45. Id. at 297. 
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sion of sexual attraction and carnal desire, it is true, is an 
extremely poor strategy for pursuing or developing a personal 
relationship with a stranger; it is also true that, especially in the 
workplace, men have too often regaled women with their sexual 
thoughts and desires, not as a sincere or authentic means of 
pursuing relationships, but as a way to make women feel 
unwelcome in previously all-male environments or to assert 
power over them. Still, for some misguided men the boorish 
expression of sexual attraction and desire might nevertheless 
represent an authentic and sincere attempt to pursue a sexual 
relationship,46 and in all events there is no reason to believe that 
such expression is anything other than “the product of 
autonomous processes.” 
The uninhibited expression of sexually graphic thoughts and 
desires is but one example of types of speech that some might 
use to pursue or develop relationships, but which the intended 
audience would usually find highly disturbing. There are, it is 
true, other internal limitations on Seana’s thinker-based theory 
that would exclude problematic expression from the strong 
protection her theory provides. For example, Seana explains that 
“a thinker-based view of freedom of speech provides no 
foundational protection for speech that aims to distort and 
control the thinker’s rational processes of tracking and 
understanding her environment.”47 To the extent, however, that 
this limitation is applicable to public discourse, the very dilution 
of protection that would result from lack of any internal 
limitations reoccurs. 
American political debate has always has been fraught with 
distortion of just this sort and indeed such distortion is 
unfortunately inevitable in political debate on hotly contested 
topics. Recent examples include the discussion of health care 
reform (recall the “death panel” scare),48 abortion (where both 
sides routinely distort the facts),49 immigration reform (where a 
 
 46. Cf. id. at 300 n.39. Here Seana criticizes Tim Scanlon’s Millian Principle for 
failing to distinguish “between false beliefs that result from fraud or intentional 
misrepresentation and false beliefs that result from sincere communication (but poor 
judgment, understanding or perception on the part of the speaker or the listener).” Id. 
She states that the former (but apparently not the latter) should count as harms under a 
thinker-based theory. Id.  
 47. Id. at 21 n.39. 
 48. Sharon Begley, The Five Biggest Lies in the Health Care Debate, NEWSWEEK, 
September 7, 2009, at 42. 
 49. See, e.g., Dan Nowicki, Kyl’s ‘Corrected’ Figures on Abortion Faulty, too, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC, April 17, 2011, at B3 (recounting how in retracting a wildly inaccurate claim 
that he had made about the percentage of Planned Parenthood’s business involved 
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misleading claim by Arizona’s governor about crimes committed 
by illegal aliens50 was matched by a New York Times editorial’s 
gross exaggeration of the scope of Arizona’s misguided attempt 
to limit illegal immigration).51 But far more unfortunate than the 
existence of such political distortions would be their punishment 
whenever a prosecutor could prove that the speaker intended to 
“distort and control the thinker’s rational processes of tracking 
and understanding her environment.”52 Such an approach to free 
speech would represent a giant step backward toward the 
darkest days for civil liberties in our nation’s history, a time in 
which courts routinely upheld convictions of anti-war protestors, 
including for intentionally making “false” statements about the 
reasons for American involvement in World War I.53 
An important criterion for judging a free speech theory is 
whether it provides adequate protection for speech, “and, in 
particular, for incendiary speech and other forms of dissent.”54 
Since the early days of the Republic there has been unremitting 
pressure on popularly-elected officials, especially in times of 
crisis, to suppress speech that vehemently challenges the status 
quo. And, of course, these officials need no impetus from the 
electorate to suppress speech critical of them or their policies. In 
contrast, government in this country has not nearly as frequently 
tried to suppress speech needed to effectuate “self-development, 
self-knowledge, knowledge of others”55 or expression essential to 
“opportunities for the exercise of one’s intellectual capacities 
including the imagination.”56 This is not to say, of course, that the 
thinker-based expression is never in danger of illegitimate 
suppression by the government. Laws forcing students to salute 
 
abortions, Senator Jon Kyl then proceeds to make a misleading claim about these 
figures); Marie McCullough, The Facts Behind ‘Partial-Birth’ Debate as the Senate 
Prepares to Take up the Abortion Issue Again, Some Questions Are Answered, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, September 16, 1998, at A01 (noting that Ron Fitzsimmons, executive director 
of the National Coalition of Abortion Providers, confessed that he had “lied through his 
teeth'' in claiming that  partial-birth abortions are only rarely performed).  
 50. Rob Margetta, Borderline Confusion: Defining ‘Safe’, 68 CQ WEEKLY 1802 
(2010). 
 51. See Editorial, Another Bad Idea from Arizona, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2010, 
at WK7.  
 52. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 300 n.39. 
 53. See, e.g., Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 251 (1920) (upholding the 
conviction of socialists for declaring, among other allegedly false statements, that 
America entered World War I to protect J.P. Morgan’s loans to the Allies).  
 54. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 285. 
 55. Id. at 291. 
 56. Id. 
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the flag discussed by Seana are a good example of undue 
interference with the realm of thought.57 But such illegitimate 
intrusions into the realm of thought and intellect can be 
prevented by meaningful protection far more flexible than the 
fierce and unyielding protection currently afforded political 
dissent. 
CONCLUSION 
For all its elegance and insight, Seana’s theory is not a good 
theory of free speech, let alone the best one, if measured by the 
free speech doctrine it will likely produce. A much better theory 
is one that reserves the most rigorous protection for the speech 
by which individuals participate in the democratic process, while 
at the same time providing meaningful but more flexible 
protection for other important free speech values, including 
important autonomy interests.58 Though Seana’s theory cannot 
be counted on to afford adequate protection for political dissent 
and other forms of public discourse, it does render an admirably 
coherent and particularly appealing account of the autonomy 
interests that should be—and for the most part already are—
protected by the First Amendment.59 To this extent, Seana’s 
thinker-based theory does make a valuable contribution both to 
the understanding and proper functioning of the American 
system of freedom of expression. 
 
 57. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 301 (discussing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 
319 U.S. 624 (1943)).  
 58. See Weinstein, supra note 13. 
 59. Or perhaps more appropriately by the Court’s substantive due process 
jurisprudence. See id. at 655–56.  
